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We are grateful to the editors of the Fordham Law Review for the
invitation to respond to Eric R. Claeys's essay, Euclid Lives?: The
Uneasy Legacy of Progressivism in Zoning,' particularly because we
are provided with the opportunity to correct any misimpressions that
some readers of the essay might have regarding the intent and content
of our commentary, Euclid Lives: The Survival of Progressive
Jurisprudence.2 We are also pleased to have the chance to reiterate
our call for a serious reconsideration of the nation's courts' misguided
reliance on the Takings Clause to resolve a wide range of disputes
regarding the validity of land-use and environmental regulation.
Our commentary seeks to clarify how courts can more effectively
wrestle with their essential review of the validity of land-use
regulations and to identify the points to which the contending lawyers
should direct their energies. Rather than relying on regulatory
takings-related phrases such as "going too far," "economically viable
use," or "right to exclude," courts and counsel should consider the
following five inquiries when evaluating the validity of land-use and
environmental regulation:
(1) Does the challenged regulation reflect the elasticity and
adaptability of traditional common law methodology?
(2) Was the challenged regulation crafted with important input by
experts from nonlegal fields, thus leaving the property owner with
the heavy burden of demonstrating unreasonableness?
(3) Does the challenged regulation hold the capacity to reduce and,
at the same time, enhance individual wealth and personal rights?
* Professor, Harvard Law School; Distinguished Visiting Professor, University of
Miami School of Law.
** Richard E. Nelson Chair in Local Government Law, Levin College of Law,
University of Florida.
1. Eric R. Claeys, Euclid Lives? The Uneasy Legacy of Progressivism in Zoning,
73 Fordham L. Rev. 731 (2004).
2. Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan Wolf, Euclid Lives: The Survival of
Progressive Jurisprudence, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2158 (2002).
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(4) Is the Court being asked to affirm judicial and popular
acceptance in the "laboratory" of the states?
(5) Is the regulatory scheme fundamentally flexible, in that it
furthers a wide range of public interests and features exemption
provisions for property owners who would otherwise be asked to
shoulder heavy burdens?3
We believe it is important for judges to maintain a measured
deference toward innovative, expert-based and flexible, regulation, in
the spirit of cases such as Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.' and
Nectow v. City of Cambridge.5 Emulating this judicial posture will
allow the continuing development of responsive regulation, drawing
its inspiration in large part from the evolving common law during the
nineteenth century, to continue for the good of society-including
landowners.
Professor Claeys is among those who would seek to repeal roughly
a century of police power regulation of the use and abuse of land.
There is perhaps no more revealing evidence of the wide gap between
Professor Claeys's and our worldviews regarding the role of public
regulation of land use than in his discussion of an essential component
of what he identifies as "Progressive political theory"-the four
"ways" Progressives developed "to institute the strong local
communities of which they were so enamored."6 "First, cities needed
to control overcrowding."7 "Second, cities and suburbs alike were
expected to zone to make themselves more presentable and more
beautiful."8 "Third, cities and especially suburbs were expected to use
regulatory powers to stabilize the price of home values."9 "Finally,
and above all else, municipalities were expected to plan. The
Progressives loathed the absence of a comprehensive plan."1 While
Professor Claeys believes that the mere assertion of these goals
demonstrates their fallaciousness, and the supposed dangers they pose
to individual private property rights, we gladly endorse them, not only
for the time in which they were formulated but for our time as well.
A point-by-point challenge to Professor Claeys's assertions would
take up too much of the reader's time. Instead, we opt to highlight
two problem areas with Euclid Lives?: (1) Professor Claeys's
inaccurate portrayal of zoning in practice and (2) his employment of
flawed history to further his ideological message. Despite Professor
Claeys's passionate nostalgia for a natural law approach to resolve
3. Id. at 2174-75.
4. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
5. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
6. Claeys, supra note 1, at 748.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 749.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 750.
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difficult questions in land-use law, because of these two shortcomings
and others, we remain unconvinced by his attempt to set the record
straight regarding the political origins of Progressive jurisprudence.
The fact that we have serious differences with Professor Claeys does
not preclude appreciating the seriousness of his effort to grapple with
the historical context for the fundamental principles that have shaped
contemporary laws of planning and the environment.
I. OUT OF THE ZONE
Constitutionally approved zoning has made many enemies during
its nearly eighty years of existence and nearly universal acceptance by
American localities. Some of the attacks on zoning, it should be
noted, are well-deserved. Like all ambitious instruments of public
policy, zoning and land-use controls, in the hands of the wrong
officials, can result in unfair treatment of landowners, developers,
neighbors, potential residents, and adjoining localities. Negative
externalities of misdirected zoning and planning decisions include
racial and socioeconomic exclusion, environmental degradation,
restraint of trade, and aesthetic snobbery. Contrary to the impression
a reader might get from Professor Claeys's essay, we did not just
awaken to the reality that these and other problems exist. Professor
Claeys, for example, asserts that our statements such as "judges who
practice the sort of Progressive jurisprudence typified by the Court's
opinion in Euclid endorse the view that legislative and administrative
efforts often result in social and economic progress for the
commonweal,""1 "make zoning sound as if it is all upside and no
downside."12
Not satisfied with just one attempt to label us and other
"conventional land-use scholars" as unabashed cheerleaders for
zoning, Professor Claeys writes, "[i]f they prefer to embrace the more
political commitments of Progressivism, they had better be prepared
to accept the bitter with the sweet."13  However, our commentary
itself belies this point. Two examples should suffice. First, in our
discussion of the experts' role in land-use regulation, we note that
courts have rightfully checked local government abuse in planning and
11. Haar & Wolf, supra note 2, at 2197.
12. Claeys, supra note 1, at 733. Perhaps Professor Clayes's conclusion might
have been true if, in our quoted passage, we had used the following instead of the
word "often": "always," "ever," "without exception," "with certainty," "universally,"
or even "more often than not."
13. Id. at 736.
2004]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
zoning.'4 And we illustrated our awareness of Progressivism's less
appealing side in its attitude toward "New Immigrants."' 5
Even if we had not included such points in the commentary, we
would have thought that our body of scholarship to date demonstrates
familiarity and, more importantly, a concern with the bitter side of
zoning and Progressivism. For example, Professor Peter Byrne, in his
review of Professor Haar's 1996 exploration of the Mount Laurel
litigation, 16 "note[s] with admiration that among the promptest
academic critics [of exclusionary zoning] was Professor Haar himself,
in a perceptive comment published nearly 45 years ago."17 Fifteen
years ago, Professor Wolf discussed Judge Westenhaver's concern,
articulated in Ambler Realty Co. v. Village of Euclid,8 about zoning's
use of socioeconomic exclusion. 9 While Professor Claeys does cite
one example of our cautionary writings,2" it is merely the tip of the
iceberg.2'
Professor Claeys's discomfort with the employment of the police
power as a regulatory tool is reflected by the words and phrases he
14. "While expert-based planning generally receives judicial approval, Nectow and
many state and lower federal cases following Euclid's guidance have protected
landowners from arbitrary and confiscatory land-use regulations, thus demonstrating
that to employ the approach of Progressive jurisprudence is not necessarily to rubber
stamp legislation." Haar & Wolf, supra note 2, at 2185 n.107.
15. "[S]ome Progressives campaigned for the restriction of 'new' immigration
from southern and eastern Europe, while others championed the nation's ability to
absorb and assimilate these newcomers." Id. at 2197 n.164 (citing Barbara Miller
Solomon, Ancestors and Immigrants: A Changing New England Tradition 122-51,
176-94 (1956)).
16. Charles M. Haar, Suburbs Under Siege: Race, Space, and Audacious Judges
(1996).
17. J. Peter Byrne, Book Review, Are Suburbs Unconstitutional?, 85 Geo. L.J.
2265, 2275 n.62 (1997) (citing Charles M. Haar, Zoning for Minimum Standards: The
Wayne Township Case, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1051 (1953)).
18. 297 F. 307 (N.D. Ohio 1924), rev'd, 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
19. Michael Allan Wolf, The Prescience and Centrality of Euclid v. Ambler, in
Zoning and the American Dream: Promises Still to Keep 252, 258-59 (Charles M.
Haar & Jerold S. Kayden eds., 1989); see also Michael Allan Wolf, Charles Warren:
Progressive, Historian (1991) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University)
(on file with authors) (discussing life and work of a leading legal and constitutional
historian who was active in Progressive politics, including the founding of the
Immigration Restriction League).
20. Claeys, supra note 1, at 767 n.172 (citing Charles M. Haar, The Twilight of
Land-Use Controls: A Paradigm Shift?, 30 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1011 (1996)).
21. See, e.g., Charles M. Haar, supra note 16; Charles M. Haar & Michael Allan
Wolf, Land-Use Planning 372 (4th ed. 1989) (noting that "to study Euclidean and
post-Euclidean zoning absent some appreciation of the 'four seeds' planted in
Sutherland's opinion-exclusion, anticompetitveness, urban design, and parochialism-
is a shallow exercise for the modern land-use attorney .... ); Charles M. Haar,
Wayne Township: Zoning for Whom?-In Brief Reply, 67 Harv. L. Rev. 986 (1954);
Michael Allan Wolf, "Compelled by Conscientious Duty": Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co. as Romance, 2 J. Sup. Ct. Hist. 88 (1997); Michael Allan Wolf,
Euclid at Threescore Years and Ten: Is This the Twilight of Environmental and Land-
Use Regulation?, 30 U. Rich. L. Rev. 961 (1996).
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uses to describe zoning, the nation's most widely-accepted land-use
regulatory program, such as "social control,' 22 "command-and-control
style of land-use,, 23 and "centralized pre-approval licensing process. "24
We also would be frightened to live in the "twilight zoning" world that
Professor Claeys presents.
In this twilight zoning world, he argues, "zoning expects that local
majorities should be given free rein to express their own communal
visions of community, security, and aesthetics., 21 Yet, in the real
zoning world, the majority and the officials they elect often have
relatively little to say about aesthetics and security, which are more
often the domain of servitudes effected by private contract. There are
many checks on the tyranny of the majority in the real zoning world:
variances, special exceptions, and, of course, resort to the courts to
correct unfair treatment and ultra vires government activity.
In the twilight zoning world, he continues, "zoning expects that
these majority-driven community visions can be implemented by local
planning experts, who bring them to life by promulgating a legislative
pattern of use districts, by enforcing the districts, and by granting
exceptions to them."26 Yet, in the real zoning world, while it is true
that experts-typically planning professionals employed by the
locality or outside consultants-do propose use districts (as well as
height and area controls, landmark districts, open spaces, and other
areas), it is the locally elected officials who finalize them as part of
their legislative duties, often after significant public comment and
revision. These experts are usually not involved with enforcement of
zoning codes or with the granting of exceptions. The membership of
the board of adjustment or zoning appeals, who grant and deny
dispensations, is typically made up of duly selected ordinary citizens,
not professional planners.
In the twilight zoning world, he asserts, once zoning went into
effect, "most land uses were presumed illegitimate unless they
conformed to the master plan's specifications for the local use
district."27 Yet, in the real zoning world, the master plan is a future-
looking vision giving broad and general guiding principles for the
locality. The master plan typically includes zoning as one of many
components, but certainly not at the level of specificity of the zoning
ordinance.28
22. Claeys, supra note 1, at 734.
23. Id. at 739.
24. Id. at 758.
25. Id. at 735.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 741.
28. While there are a few states, such as Florida, that have imbued the master plan
with legal bite in the area of zoning amendments, these jurisdictions remain a distinct




In the twilight zoning world, he claims, "[e]ach local owner loses
substantial freedom to control the use of his own parcel of land, but
gains the opportunity to vote on how his neighbors ought to use their
properties." 9 Yet, in the real zoning world, localities and their
residents must adhere to two Supreme Court decisions from 191230
and 1928,1 making clear that a veto by neighbors of a landowner's
proposed land use is unconstitutional. Like Euclid, neither of these
wise decisions has been reversed. It is true that referendum zoning
caught on in some jurisdictions near the end of the twentieth century,
but this device typically involves giving voters the opportunity to vote
on whether the legislative decision by local officials to permit a zoning
change favoring a landowner-developer should be overturned.32
Despite the growing popularity of these plebiscites, and their
acceptance by the United States Supreme Court,33 the vast majority of
zoning and rezoning decisions are made by elected officials, not by
direct democracy.
In the twilight zoning world, he holds, "the majorities pass on some
of their newfound power to their administrative delegates-local land-
use planners-who implement the majorities' will in two stages.
Zoning commissions supervise and enforce the zones.... ,3 Yet, in
the real zoning world, majorities as voters have neither a direct or
indirect relationship with the planning professionals who advise their
elected and appointed officials. While in some jurisdictions zoning
commissioners may be characterized as "administrative delegates,"
they are appointed, or sometimes elected, members who are advised
by local land-use planners. Building inspectors, concerned citizens,
and, in some localities, a zoning administrator, are the ones who make
sure that owners comply with zoning codes.
How can the reader who now appreciates Professor Claeys's
problematic depictions of the law and practice of zoning share his
alarmism about majority control, governance by unaccountable
experts, and rigid restraints on property use? The zoning described in
Part II of his essay is not the system of land-use regulation that was
29. Claeys, supra note 1, at 741.
30. Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912) (holding unconstitutional a
city ordinance allowing two-thirds of the property owners on a street to request that a
street committee determine the street's building line).
31. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928)
(finding unconstitutional an ordinance requiring consent of neighboring landowners
to enable a trustee to replace a philanthropic home in a residence district).
32. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter., Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
33. See City of Cuyahoga Falls v. Buckeye Cmty. Hope Found., 538 U.S. 188
(2003) (finding that there was no constitutional violation in city's subjection of a site-
plan approval to a referendum); Eastlake, 426 U.S. at 668 (holding that a requirement
that changes in existing land uses by the city council be submitted to a referendum
was not unconstitutional).
34. Claeys, supra note 1, at 741.
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endorsed by the early zoning advocates whose words are selectively
presented in Part III of his essay.
Too many anti-planning and anti-zoning attacks by staunch
defenders of private property rights paint a bleak world in which
American property owners are placed in a regulatory straitjacket at
the mercy of anti-development local government officials and their
planning staffs. Observers from other countries would scoff at this
misrepresentation of our relatively burden-free system of land-use
regulation. Even the most Locke-loving legal authorities from the
early national period would be impressed with the rapid pace of real
estate development and concomitant real property-based wealth in
every region of the nation. With all of the serious ills that plague our
abundantly wealthy nation today-persistent poverty and
underemployment, lingering racial and gender discrimination, and the
health care conundrum, to mention only a prominent few-we confess
that we continue to be taken aback by those who find the American
property owner the citizen most in need of heightened constitutional
protection.
II. MATrERS OF HISTORY
At one point in his essay, when considering zoning as an example of
Professor Henry Smith's notion of a "'governance'-based regime,"
Professor Claeys states, "[t]he legal history matters here. ... 3 We
would expand that statement to read, "the history matters always."
Unfortunately, in too many places in his essay, the history misses the
mark.
We will limit our comments to four examples of the troublesome
use of history by Professor Claeys: (1) selective reading and
presentation of early planning materials; (2) tenuous and
anachronistic assertions about the ideas that influenced early planning
and zoning advocates; (3) unrealistic presentation of the natural law
and natural rights hegemony in the pre-Progressive period; and (4)
misreading of the landmark Mount Laurel case.
Professor Claeys's exploration of the writing of early zoning and
planning advocates is found in the heart of his essay: "Part II: The
Progressives' Case for Zoning." According to Professor Claeys,
"[t]his Progressive-political account of zoning deserves to be taken
seriously .... As a matter of history, it fills an important gap in our
understanding about zoning's origins. '"36 "Most important," he
continues, "this political account of zoning exposes significant gaps in
the standard legal account of zoning-Haar and Wolf's account of
35. Id. at 736 (discussing Henry E. Smith, Exclusion and Property Rules in the
Law of Nuisance, 90 Va. L. Rev. 965 (2004)).
36. Id. at 757.
2004] 777
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'Progressive jurisprudence.' 3 7  Unfortunately, there are too many
gaps in the essay's own historical presentation.
Lawyers devoted to natural law and natural rights, according to
Professor Claeys, knew that "land-use law needed to change with the
times."3  Apparently, they differed from their Progressive
counterparts in three chief ways: early zoning and planning advocates
(1) "concluded that new times required not only new laws but also
new principles";39 (2) viewed "individualistic property rights... as
reactionary"; 4° and (3) believed that the notion of progress "replaced
rule under law with administration by experts."'41 In his attempt to
prove these important and controversial assertions regarding the
radical political thought informing Progressive land-use reformers,
Professor Claeys gleans a diverse set of books, essays, speeches, and
presentations 42 by a group of advocates that was much less
homogeneous than Professor Claeys would have us believe.43
Professor Claeys's assertions regarding the extreme political beliefs
of the zoning advocates are simply not supported by the quotations he
has excerpted from these wide-ranging sources. For example,
although Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. is quoted as saying that "'old
buildings, old streets, [and] old institutions must give way,"'" neither
Olmsted nor anyone else quoted in this part of the essay says anything
37. Id.
38. Id. at 744.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 753.
41. Id. at 754.
42. In the two decades before the Court's opinion in Euclid, for example, the
National Conference of City Planning published an annual set of proceedings that
included, among other contributions, descriptions of new and proposed city zoning
schemes and discussions of specific topics such as industrial zoning, regional planning,
and war housing. More significantly, the proceedings recorded often heated
exchanges between many of the leading figures in the field. See, e.g., Discussion, in
Proceedings of the Eleventh National Conference on City Planning 185-94 (1920);
Discussion, in Proceedings of the Tenth National Conference on City Planning 43-45
(1918).
43. Professor Claeys does note that "Progressive views varied more about
property than about other features of land-use regulation," but that does not stop him
from criticizing the ideas of a group he calls "Mainline Progressives." Claeys, supra
note 1, at 751. In reality, these advocates differed sharply on some essential points.
At the tenth national conference, for example, following Robert H. Whitten's
presentation on The Zoning of Residence Sections, there were several exchanges
regarding the wisdom and legality of using zoning to separate native-born from
foreign-born residents. Discussion, in Proceedings of the Tenth National Conference
on City Planning 43-45 (1918). The following year, Harland Bartholomew, Lawson
Purdy, and E.M. Bassett offered sharply differing views regarding the wisdom and
legality of segregating houses from other residential uses. Discussion, in Proceedings
of the Eleventh National Conference on City Planning 185-94 (1920).
44. Claeys, supra note 1, at 744 (quoting Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., Reply in
Behalf of the City Planning Conference, in Proceedings of the Third National
Conference on City Planning 10 (1911)).
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about getting rid of permanent legal or constitutional principles. 45
Similarly, none of the statements Professor Claeys quotes in support
of his claim that the Progressives characterized individualistic
property rights as reactionary even includes a specific reference to
"property rights." And while Professor Claeys asserts that these
Progressives "deprecated judges, 46 we would ask the reader to find
one quotation that indicates anything more than respectful
questioning of the judiciary. In Holmesean terms, given the meager
evidence he presents in his essay, Professor Claeys just goes "too far"
in his characterization of Progressives' political beliefs.
Professor Claeys's second problem with the use of history surfaces
in his attempt to explain the origins of the ideas that influenced major
planning and zoning figures during the Progressive Era. For example,
he locates the philosophical roots of the "communitarian spirit
47
permeating the ideas and work of these advocates: "Moody,
Metzenbaum, and Wilson were voicing themes that trace back to
Jean-Jacques Rousseau. '48  The origins of this communitarianism
sound ominous in Professor Claeys's formulation: "Rousseau's social
contract promised to solve what he diagnosed as the fundamental
problem in the human condition: that man is so free that he knows
little better than to enslave himself out of fear of his freedom. '49 He
goes on to note that the Progressives' Rousseau-inspired
"communitarian ideals exerted tremendous pressure on earlier
conceptions of the police power,"" and that the result was a
contraction of private property rights."
The road from Rousseau to the Standard State Zoning Enabling
Act,52 as charted by Professor Claeys, is certainly long and winding, if
not tortuous.5 3  It starts with The Social Contract5 4 in 1762, which
"influenced" the work of Hegel in the early nineteenth century, which
then "influenced" the German universities in which many American
Progressives received part of their education. Presumably, even if
they did not attend German universities themselves, Moody,
Metzenbaum, Wilson, and others came under the influence of
Progressive thinkers whose continental training contained a dose of
Hegelian and, in turn, Rousseauvian thought. The result was a
45. Id. at 744-46.
46. Id. at 754.
47. Id. at 748.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 750.
51. Id. at 751-54.
52. Dep't of Commerce Advisory Comm. On Zoning, A Standard State Zoning
Enabling Act: Under Which Municipalities May Adopt Zoning Regulations (1926).
53. See Claeys, supra note 1, at 742-51.
54. Jean Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract (Maurice Cranston trans.,
Penguin Classics 1972) (1762).
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critique of "the more individually-centered conception of use rights."55
This is a speculative and tenuous chain of causation that minimizes
competing theories influencing European and American institutions
of higher learning during this period (for example, the ideas of Locke,
Montesquieu, and Hobbes) and maximizes the influence that the
abstract Hegelian ideas had on the highly practical, pragmatic, even
mundane work of the participants in the National Conference on City
Planning. However, while the champions of comprehensive planning
and of the segregation of uses into locally legislated districts may have
indulged on occasion in the rhetoric of community in order to sway
their fellow advocates, there was no concerted effort to tear down the
notion of private property or to weaken the judiciary. We agree with
Professor Dan Mandelker that Alfred Bettman's brief, in which he
showed important connections between zoning and traditional
common law principles, is "a more accurate representation of the
intentions of Progressive land-use lawyers" than the selected
quotations found in Part II of Professor Claeys's essay. 6 We also
believe that Bettman's position and the position of other defenders of
zoning should not be dismissed as disingenuous statements designed
to pull one over on the Court.
In his zeal to discredit the theoretical underpinnings of American
planning and zoning and of Progressive jurisprudence, Professor
Claeys confuses chronology as well. He claims that the "broader
trends" of political Progressivism and legal realism "left their mark on
the first wave of land-use reformers," a group that "critiqued
individualistic property rights along the lines laid down by Progressive
political theory, utilitarian interest balancing, and legal realism." 7 It
is true that some of the ideas offered by some legal realists were
shared by some early planning and zoning advocates. However, it is
highly unlikely, if not impossible, that these advocates, writing before
1920,58 were influenced by legal realism, a movement that did not gain
currency until the 1920s and 1930s.59 More importantly, as noted
previously, the positions of these early advocates do not really
correspond with the extreme anti-property notions that typify
Professor Claeys's version of political Progressivism.
Professor Claeys's third major shortfall in the use of history is the
manner in which he portrays the dominance of traditional natural law
and natural rights principles on the eve of Progressivism. Where
Professor Claeys sees a revolutionary overthrow of the legal ancien
55. Claeys, supra note 1, at 751.
56. Id. at 763 n.159.
57. Id. at 753.
58. Id.
59. See generally G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism:
Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 Va. L. Rev.
999 (1972).
[Vol. 73780
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r~gime, we see evolutionary change tied closely and directly to the
common-law tradition and to the deep respect for property rights that
has always been a hallmark of the American legal system. When
describing the constitutional protection of property rights on the eve
of the Supreme Court's opinion in Euclid, Professor Claeys observes:
Owners were presumed to deserve the greatest range of freedom
available to use their properties for their own purposes. The law
protected owners from pollution, vibrations, and other discrete and
physical invasions of their use rights. That protection secured to
owners a right to control the active use and development of their
lots for their own purposes. At the same time, it generally refrained
from enforcing uniformity requirements or pursuing aesthetic goals.
Owners had to give up any right to complain about disuniformity or
eyesores as the price for preserving the right to decide for
themselves how to use their own lots.6°
If this portrait of the nineteenth century American legal landscape
as a wonderland of individualistic private property rights were
accurate, how is it possible that commentators such as John F. Hart
have found-even during the formative, Lockean period of the
American legal ethos-significant environmental and aesthetic
regulation of land use by local ordinance and state statute? In an
article with which Professor Claeys is quite familiar,61 Hart notes,
Contrary to the conventional image of minimal land use regulation,
government in the colonial period often exerted extensive authority
over private land for purposes unrelated to avoiding nuisance.
Colonial lawmakers often regulated private landowners' usage of
their land in order to secure public benefits, not merely to prevent
harm to health and safety. Indeed, the public benefits pursued by
such legislative action included some that consisted essentially of
benefits for other private landowners. Legislatures often attempted
to influence or control the development of land for particular
productive purposes thought to be in the public good. ... In towns
and cities, landowners were constrained by measures intended to
channel the spatial pattern of development, to optimize the density
of habitation, to promote development of certain kinds of land, and
to implement aesthetic goals.62
60. Claeys, supra note 1, at 738.
61. Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88 Cornell
L. Rev. 1549, 1562-65 (2003) [hereinafter Claeys, Takings, Regulations]; see also Eric
R. Claeys, Takings and Private Property on the Rehnquist Court, 99 Nw. U. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=560387#PaperDownload.
62. John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use and Its Significance for Modem Takings
Doctrine, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1252, 1257 (1996) (citations omitted); see also John F.
Hart, Land Use Law in the Early Republic and the Original Meaning of the Takings
Clause, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1099 (2000). Hart writes:
The same variety of public welfare objectives is observable for these years as
for the colonial period. Aesthetic regulation of town buildings was common.
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Professor Claeys's response to the findings of Hart and other
respectable scholars who have made similar findings is that "the
original sources they cite [must be] studied with closer care."63
However, we, like many other legal commentators, 64 are not as
skeptical of Hart's comprehensive and variegated view of the legal
landscape during this important formative period. Professor Claeys
attempts to portray Euclidean zoning as a radical departure from
existing regulatory practices, but the historical reality was that the
shift from pre-zoning to zoning (and nineteenth century constitutional
law to the deference of the Euclid Court) was not as sudden as this
and other passages would lead the reader to believe.
Professor Claeys contrasts the Court's opinion in Buchanan v.
Warley65 and Judge Westenhaver's trial court opinion in Euclid as
representative of the constitutional law treatment of land-use
regulation before a marked shift that occurred when the Justices
decided in favor of the Village of Euclid.' 6 This account of an abrupt
shift away from constitutional law protections of private property is
not consistent with the record of the Court's decisions for the two
decades preceding Euclid, however. In his careful study of land-use
opinions during this key period, when Progressives by no means
dominated the Court, Professor Gordon Hylton reveals:
Almost forgotten is the fact that during the preceding two decades
the Supreme Court heard numerous challenges to state and
municipal land use regulations. In these cases, which required the
Court to define the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee that one could not be deprived of property without due
process of law, the supposedly property-rights oriented Fuller and
White Courts sided with the state in almost every instance. Time
after time, and with only one dissenting vote in two decades, the
Court found that the police power was sufficiently broad to warrant
Riparian land was subordinated to the policy of promoting economic
development that would benefit the public. Farmers who owned wetlands
were obliged by local majorities of their neighbors to have their lands
drained and to contribute to the costs of drainage. Other farmers were
obliged to participate in coercive fencing projects. The public interest in the
development of mines and metal production was given precedence over the
wishes of affected landowners. Some landowners were prohibited from
selling their interests in land. And legislatures sometimes enacted statutes
declaring that owners of unimproved land must improve or occupy such
lands or forfeit their title.
Id. at 1102 (citations omitted).
63. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, supra note 61, at 1563.
64. Hart's excellent work is widely cited in the legal literature. See, e.g., Robert C.
Ellickson, New Institutions for Old Neighborhoods, 48 Duke L.J. 75, 90 n.66 (1998);
Eric T. Freyfogle, Ethics, Community, and Private Land, 23 Ecology L.Q. 631, 640-41
nn.31-34 (1996); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Expropriatory Intent: Defining the
Proper Boundaries of Substantive Due Process and the Takings Clause, 80 N.C. L.
Rev. 713,736 & n.104 (2002).
65. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
66. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
[Vol. 73
EUCLID LIVES
restrictions on the use of land, even when they eliminated existing
uses and imposed severe economic loss on landowners. These cases
provided a strong pro-regulation backdrop against which the cases
of the 1920s were decided.67
When the full set of cases is studied in this fashion, we see that the
private property owner's victory in Buchanan was decidedly atypical,68
and that Judge Westenhaver's judgment as to the illegitimacy of
zoning was much less representative of the status quo than the many
opinions approving zoning that were cited by Justice Sutherland in
Euclid.69
Professor Claeys's fourth problem with history arises during his
extensive discussion of the Mount Laurel70 litigation in Part IV of his
essay. He calls Mount Laurel, the landmark decision of the New
Jersey Supreme Court nearly thirty years ago that declared
exclusionary zoning invalid, "a poster child for many of the deepest
problems in zoning,"71 and states that the case "powerfully illustrates
how zoning's idealism falls short in practice."72 While we might agree
that the zoning practices of the township are most troublesome (and
have written such for the record)73 , we differ dramatically with his
account of, and conclusions regarding, the court's decision. To
borrow Professor Claeys's metaphor, we believe that, by enunciating
the "Mount Laurel doctrine" in the fight against exclusionary zoning,
the court was engaged in a noble effort to make the bitter sweet.
Professor Claeys asserts: "The trial court had concluded that the
proper remedy was to declare Mount Laurel's zoning system
67. Joseph Gordon Hylton, Prelude to Euclid: The United States Supreme Court
and the Constitutionality of Land Use Regulation, 1900-1920, 3 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y
1, 2 (2000).
68. Professor Hylton writes:
Although the Court in this era viewed the determination of the
reasonableness of a police power regulation as one of its responsibilities, it
routinely upheld the legitimacy of local land use controls.... Only in
Buchanan v. Warley was an ordinance found to be an unreasonable exercise
of the police power and that case involved a blatant effort to use the police
power to shield an unconstitutional act of racial discrimination. In spite of
the "pro-property" reputation of the Supreme Court under Fuller and to a
lesser extent White, the Court proved repeatedly that it was indifferent to
pecuniary losses suffered by the landowners. Ordinarily the benefit of the
doubt went to the state, and so long as the evidence did not show that the
action was undertaken in bad faith or for a purpose that went beyond the
contemporary understanding of the police power or violated a separate
constitutional right (like the right to buy and sell property free from state-
imposed racial restrictions), the statute was presumed legitimate.
Id. at 34-35 (citation omitted).
69. 272 U.S. at 390-93.
70. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713
(N.J. 1975).
71. Claeys, supra note 1, at 767.
72. Id. at 768.
73. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text.
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unconstitutional. The New Jersey Supreme Court was not prepared
to go so far."74 Yes, the court did not find it necessary to hold that the
township had violated the Federal Constitution, as urged by the
plaintiffs .7 However, the New Jersey Supreme Court did find that the
township had violated the state constitution, and it is important to
review the specific language used by the court:
It is elementary theory that all police power enactments, no matter
at what level of government, must conform to the basic state
constitutional requirements of substantive due process and equal
protection of the laws. These are inherent in Art. I, par. 1 of our
Constitution, the requirements of which may be more demanding
than those of the federal Constitution. It is required that,
affirmatively, a zoning regulation, like any police power enactment,
must promote public health, safety, morals or the general welfare.
(The last term seems broad enough to encompass the others.)
Conversely, a zoning enactment which is contrary to the general
welfare is invalid.76
In other words, the idea of "general welfare" is the portal through
which the court enters to attack exclusionary zoning practices.
In his account of the Mount Laurel decision, Professor Claeys
makes nary a mention of "general welfare."77 Instead, to him the case
is an example of what happens when "Progressive ideals overestimate
how far community, order, and security can suppress people's selfish
and rivalrous tendencies[.] ' 78  We can understand why Professor
Claeys would not want to celebrate the court's use of general welfare
to address the abuse of zoning power by some New Jersey suburban
local governments. In Professor Claeys's mind, in a zero-sum game
general welfare expands at the expense of something much more
important: "the scope of owners' 'private property' in the rights to
control the use of their land."79 In sharp contrast, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, which sees the rights to own and use private property
as an essential part of the general welfare, is attempting to correct an
imbalance in the exercise of localities' planning and zoning powers.
Despite Professor Claeys's wishes, there is no need to resort to Judge
Westenhaver's anti-zoning approach, a move that would have been
unnecessarily disruptive given all of the expectations on the private
74. Claeys, supra note 1, at 769 (citation omitted).
75. See Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d at 725 ("We reach this conclusion under state law
and so do not find it necessary to consider federal constitutional grounds urged by
plaintiffs."). While the lower court did refer to federal constitutional cases, the judge
never articulated the specific provision of federal or state constitutional law upon
which he based his conclusion of invalidity. See S. Burlington County NAACP v.
Township of Mount Laurel, 290 A.2d 466-74 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1972).
76. Id. at 725-26 (citations omitted).
77. This is despite the fact that the phrase "general welfare" appears in the
majority opinion in Mount Laurel more than a dozen times. See id.
78. Claeys, supra note 1, at 769.
79. Id. at 751.
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and public side that have arisen in the decades since the Euclid Court
allowed the zoning experiment to continue.
Professor Claeys's legal history of exclusionary zoning also fails
because he ends the tale much too soon. He states: "Better to let
developers and poorer citizens help each other, than to expect both to
convince a state legislature to impose affordable housing duties on
local governments and state regulators to enforce those duties
effectively."8 The real saga continues with the New Jersey Supreme
Court's monumental and highly controversial opinion in Mount
Laurel 1,81 the state legislature's passage of the Fair Housing Act,82
and subsequent cases in which the New Jersey Supreme Court has
considered the legacy of the Mount Laurel doctrine in the light of
statutory and regulatory additions. The true story of the struggle
against exclusionary zoning in New Jersey involves a judiciary that has
created procedures (such as special courts to hear Mount Laurel
challenges), substantive rules (such as the affirmative obligation to
provide affordable housing), and remedies (such as the builder's
remedy) in their efforts to enlist all branches of state and local
government to find a creative way of allowing landowners and
developers throughout the Garden State to build least-cost housing
for the state's neediest residents.
The Mount Laurel opinion, like its successors, is an important
demonstration that Euclid and Progressive jurisprudence work. 3
While Professor Claeys would have preferred that the New Jersey
Supreme Court turn back the clock fifty years, we commend the court
for choosing the Progressive jurisprudential path represented by
Euclid and Nectow. For, contrary to Professor Claeys's version, the
true story is that in the Mount Laurel litigation and in other decisions,
the New Jersey Supreme Court used an evolving and adaptive notion
of the "general welfare" to fine tune and readjust zoning and planning
for the state's metropolitan regions.
III. LAST THINGS: THE POSITIVE LEGACY OF PROGRESSIVE
JURISPRUDENCE
Even after taking Professor Claeys's excursion through Progressive
political thought, and despite his warning regarding the "uneasy
80. Id. at 770.
81. S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390
(N.J. 1983).
82. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 52:27 D301-329 (West 2004).
83. In fact, the state supreme court cites the Euclid opinion itself to bolster the
notion that one locality cannot stand in the way of regional needs: "[W]hen
regulation does have a substantial external impact, the welfare of the state's citizens
beyond the borders of the particular municipality cannot be disregarded and must be
recognized and served." S. Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel,




legacy of 'Progressive jurisprudence,"'' 4 we remain quite comfortable
in endorsing our five-point strategy for judges and lawyers seeking
guidance through the morass of caselaw and commentary involving
allegedly confiscatory regulation of land use. We close by revisiting a
key passage from Justice Sutherland's opinion for the Euclid Court,
and two modern evocations of Progressive jurisprudence that suggest
strongly that Euclid does and should maintain its lodestar status.
Justice Sutherland, who was far from an anti-property rights radical,
perceived the potential of enlightened and sensitive regulatory
responses to the needs of a swiftly changing society within the
confines of constitutional law:
[W]hile the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the
scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new
and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field
of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible that it
should be otherwise. But although a degree of elasticity is thus
imparted, not to the meaning, but to the application of constitutional
principles, statutes and ordinances, which, after giving due weight to
the new conditions, are found clearly not to conform to the
Constitution, of course, must fall.85
In language such as this, Professor Claeys sees an organic,
relativistic notion of law and morals.8 6 We see a direct connection to
the adaptive view of common law that typified the best of nineteenth
century American jurisprudence.87
Concurring opinions found in two of the Supreme Court's most
recent land-use decisions give special force to the cogency and lasting
import of the Euclidean approach. Each opinion comes from a Justice
identified with the center of the Rehnquist Court on the issue of
private property rights, and each typifies an organic view of law that,
much like the majority opinion in Euclid, seeks to strike the right
balance between public and private interests, while respecting the
most essential principles that continue to inform our Constitution.
84. Claeys, supra note 1.
85. Euclid, 272 U.S. 365, 387 (1926).
86. Early Progressives "thought that, in their era, social conditions had changed
enough to downgrade moral goods like freedom and to upgrade more collective
goods, including order, community, and security." Claeys, supra note 1, at 759.
87. Perhaps the soundest evocation of that philosophy is found in a Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court opinion written by Chief Justice Lemuel Shaw, who observed
that:
[W]hen a new practice or new course of business arises, the rights and duties
of parties are not without a law to govern them; the general considerations
of reason, justice and policy, which underlie the particular rules of the
common law, will still apply, modified and adapted, by the same
considerations, to the new circumstances.
Haar & Wolf, supra note 2, at 2178 (quoting Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Me.
R.R., 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 263, 268 (1854)).
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In his concurring opinion in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal
Council,88 Justice Anthony Kennedy offers this word of caution to all
of his colleagues:
In my view, reasonable expectations must be understood in light of
the whole of our legal tradition. The common law of nuisance is too
narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex
and interdependent society. The State should not be prevented
from enacting new regulatory initiatives in response to changing
conditions, and courts must consider all reasonable expectations
whatever their source.... I agree with the Court that nuisance
prevention accords with the most common expectations of property
owners who face regulation, but I do not believe this can be the sole
source of state authority to impose severe restrictions.8 9
In 2001, nine years after Lucas, in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island,90 Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor, also concurring with the majority, provides
this caveat:
As I understand it, our decision today does not remove the
regulatory backdrop against which an owner takes title to property
from the purview of the Penn Central inquiry. It simply restores
balance to that inquiry. Courts properly consider the effect of
existing regulations under the rubric of investment-backed
expectations in determining whether a compensable taking has
occurred. As before, the salience of these facts cannot be reduced to
any "set formula." 91
This fact-centered, flexible, responsive judicial posture, so close in
tone and substance to the early American notion of an adaptive
common law, has been honed for a legal world of statutes, ordinances,
and regulations. This eminently usable and experience-based judicial
posture has survived decades of social, economic, and technological
change, and has accommodated even profound transformations in
political theory. This is the most important and enduring legacy of
Euclid and of Progressive jurisprudence, as all of the participants in
our legal system struggle to meet the needs and aspirations of the
contemporary American metropolis.
88. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
89. Id. at 1035 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
90. 533 U.S. 606 (2001).
91. Id. at 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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